Open peer commentary on the article “Lived Experience and Cognitive Science Reappraising Enactivism’s Jonasian Turn” by Mario Villalobos & Dave Ward. Upshot: This commentary questions an assumption in the target article to the effect that science prohibits projecting any intentional properties or entities outside of human experience.

Résumé: La conscience est toujours conscience de quelque chose, généralement une chose autre qu’elle-même - mais quelle sorte de chose est donc la conscience, considérée en et pour elle-même? Naguère redoutable paradoxe qu’une science sérieuse abandonnait volontiers aux philosophes, la conscience a-t-elle été ramenée finalement à la condition d’un objet de science parmi les autres? Le développement d’une nouvelle «neuroscience de la conscience» depuis une vingtaine d’années est souvent présenté comme une avancée naturelle pour une science forte de son succès (...) dans l’explication des fonctions cognitives sur la base des mécanismes neuronaux du cerveau humain. Conçue, elle aussi, originairement, comme «science de la conscience», mais sur la base de l’immanence du sujet conscient à sa propre expérience vécue, la phénoménologie doit-elle réfréner son sens du paradoxe devant le projet de cette neuroscience de la conscience, pour ne pas être accusée d’irrationalisme? Faisant retour sur le dialogue Changeux-Ricœur, je relève les objections du phénoménologue à l’objectivation de notre expérience de la conscience sur la base de mécanismes corrélatifs dans le cerveau et j’examine sur l’exemple représentatif de la théorie neuronale de Changeux, Dehaene et al. dans quelle mesure cette critique phénoménologique garde une pertinence. Resumo: A consciência é sempre consciência de algo, geralmente algo diferente de si - mas que tipo de coisa é a consciência, considerada em si mesma? Paradoxo a pouco tempo temido de que uma ciência séria se entrega de bom grado aos filósofos, será que a consciência foi finalmente reduzida à condição de um objeto da ciência, dentre os demais? O desenvolvimento de uma nova “neurociência da consciência” por cerca de vinte anos é frequentemente apresentado como um avanço natural para uma ciência segura de seu sucesso na explicação de funções cognitivas baseadas nos mecanismos neurais do cérebro humano. Concebida, também, originalmente como uma “ciência da consciência”, mas com base na imanência do sujeito consciente à sua própria experiência vivida, a fenomenologia deve refrear seu sentido de paradoxo frente ao projeto da neurociência da consciência, para não ser acusada de irracionalismo? Retornando ao diálogo Changeux-Ricoeur, considero a crítica da objetivação fenomenológica da nossa experiência de consciência com base em mecanismos internos ao cérebro, e examino o exemplo representativo da teoria neuronal de Changeux e Dehaene et al., para avaliar até que ponto a crítica fenomenológica permanece relevante. (shrink)

Citizen petitions and legislative bills in seven states in the US have established space and movement limitations for selected species of farm animals. These actions show Americans becoming concerned about the humane treatment of confined farm animals, and willing to use governmental intervention to preclude existing confinement practices. The individual state provisions vary, including the coverage of species. All seven states deal with sow-gestation crates, five states address veal calf crates, and two states’ provisions also apply to battery cages used (...) for egg-laying hens. The actions show citizen and legislative opposition to current animal production practices, and suggest a movement to provide better treatment for farm animals. Accompanying the actions are challenges for animal production industries in remaining competitive while meeting social expectations on the ethical treatment of food animals. While the actions are only a small step in addressing welfare issues, they may be the beginning of a significant movement to do more to address human and animal welfare issues. (shrink)

The United States Fish and Wildlife Service in Alaska, USA, conducted a species status assessment for a petition to list the Alexander Archipelago wolf (Canis lupus ligoni) under the Endangered Species Act in 2020-2022. This federal undertaking could not be adequately prepared without including the knowledge of Indigenous People who have a deep cultural connection with the subspecies. Our objective is to communicate the authoritative expertise and voice of the Indigenous People who partnered on the project by demonstrating how their (...) knowledge contributed to the species status assessment. The Indigenous knowledge applied in the assessment is the cultural and intellectual property of those who have shared it. We employed rapid appraisal research to expeditiously develop a preliminary and qualitative understanding of Indigenous People's cultural and ecological knowledge of Alexander Archipelago wolves. We used semi-directed interviewing and inductive coding from grounded theory for text analysis. Indigenous knowledge contributed to the agency's understanding of the Alexander Archipelago wolf in Southeast Alaska and helped the agency with their classification decision. Indigenous research partners explained the rich cultural significance and position of wolves in Tlingit society and described human–wolf relationships and ecological interactions. The agency used a single-species assessment approach based in species ecology and conservation biology, whereas the Indigenous wolf experts applied a multi-species, community ecology approach based in a sociocultural context of balance and respect. The Indigenous wolf experts successfully addressed knowledge gaps identified by the agency. The partners were challenged by a short regulatory timeframe that did not allow for comprehensive study of Indigenous knowledge and constrained review and feedback by Indigenous experts. The United States Fish and Wildlife Service learned that its assessment framework was not designed to account for an Indigenous worldview. To level the playing field, the agency and Indigenous experts should discuss how to co-develop an assessment framework that equitably applies both perspectives. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Libanius the Sophist: Rhetoric, Reality, and Religion in the Fourth Century by Raffaella CribioreRobert J. PenellaRaffaella Cribiore. Libanius the Sophist: Rhetoric, Reality, and Religion in the Fourth Century. Townsend Lectures/Cornell University Studies in Classical Philology. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2013. x + 260 pp. Cloth, $49.95.Raffaella Cribiore has earned her Libanian stripes, especially with her The School of Libanius in Late Antique Antioch (Princeton 2007). When she (...) was invited to give the Townsend Lectures at Cornell University, of which the book under review is the published version, she decided to use that occasion as an opportunity to settle some Libanian misunderstandings, to insist on certain methodological principles, and to offer solutions to some specific problems. The book touches on a good number of discrete points; it might be described as a Libanian mélange. But, as its title indicates, the agenda revolves around matters of rhetoric and religion.In chapter 1, “Rhetoric and the Distortion of Reality,” the central exhibit is Oration 1, Libanius’ so-called autobiography. Cribiore provides a good discussion of its compositional history—the main section (1–155) written in 374 when Libanius was sixty years old and the rest at various sittings from 380 to 393—and of the main lines of its narrative. Any autobiography is, of course, an interpretive construction, a “distortion of reality,” made at a certain point or points in one’s lifetime. Cribiore explores Libanius’ self-interpretations, most famously the [End Page 537] role he allots to Tychē in his life. She shows how Libanius’ letters, written with immediacy at a particular point in time, can sometimes act as a factual corrective to the autobiography. Cribiore wonders whether one source of Libanius’ self-shaping may have been the holy-man tradition. She is struck by commonalities in Libanius’ autobiography and biographies of Apollonius of Tyana, Pythagoras, and Plotinus, although she does not believe that the Philostratean and Neopla-tonic works in question directly inspired Libanius. On the other hand, she argues that he read Athanasius’ life of the Christian monk Antony, in which he “could find much that could help him shape the narrative of his own life” (74). While I would not deny that Libanius might have read this work, I am not convinced that we need to invoke it to explain similarities of motif (or of counter-motif) found in his autobiography. All the commonalities are better seen, in Mortimer Smith’s words, as arising “from the general religious and intellectual milieu” (63).Chapter 2, “A Rhetor and His Audience: The Role of Invective,” depicts Libanius as a master of the emotions—provoking pity, anger, and shame, and also consoling grief—and of invective and satire. Personal invective had deep roots in the classical past; and classical models of invective, especially Demosthenes and Aeschines, were still inspiring emulation in Libanius’ day. Libanius could control the size of his listening or reading audience and suppress proper names or resort to allusion in attacking contemporary figures in his orations, but Cribiore rejects Paul Petit’s view that Libanius kept his most abusive orations “hidden in his file drawers,” intended “only for himself or for an audience of two or three friends” (86–87). They were far more publicly intended than that. The publicity of invective, though, raises a problem: the same Libanius who condemns certain public figures in the orations is very polite to them in the letters. (Cribiore is particularly interested in the case of Proclus, comes Orientis in 383–84.) Does this not make Libanius a hypocrite who can turn easily from invective to flattery? Cribiore tries to mitigate bald inconsistency by observing that traditional invective would have been taken cum grano salis, whereas a friendly and restrained tone would have been expected in letters. Fair enough. But such an observation, based on conventions of genre and the expectations of the audiences, tells us very little about the writer’s actual state of mind and behavior in any particular case. Cribiore’s insistence here on the publicity (more or less) of orations is one side of a coin that first appears in chapter 1, although it is not put to much... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ad UnguemArmand J. D'Angour vos, oPompilius sanguis, carmen reprehendite, quod nonmulta dies et multa litura coercuit atquepraesectum deciens non castigavit ad unguem.(Horace Ars Poetica 291–94) You, OSons of Pompilius, condemn that poem whichmany a day and many an erasure has not pruned andwhittled down and chastened tenfold to the nail."Censure a poem," Brink paraphrases, "which has not been reduced to right proportions and (when it has been reduced) has (...) not been tested to a nicety."1 Tested, that is, by its author, whose action Horace has been thought here to be likening to the way a sculptor examines a completed work for flaws. Translations of the final line commonly expand the phrase ad unguem to specify such a connotation, often taking praesectum to qualify unguem as in "to meet the test of the well–pared nail."2 But Brink has advanced convincing arguments against the supposition that praesectum qualifies unguem.3 Moreover, praesectum is positioned for emphasis and followed directly by deciens: the words must elaborate the process described by the foregoing coercuit.4Praesectum [End Page 411] thus picks up carmen, and no reference to the artisan's manicure should be supposed.5Ad unguem remains as a self–contained expression, to be understood in its own right.The image introduced in the following lines has been thought to present a deliberate point of contrast in the matter of the sculptor's fingernails:ingenium misera quia fortunatius artecredit et excludit sanos Helicone poetasDemocritus, bona pars non ungues ponere curat,non barbam, secreta petit loca, balnea vitat.(AP 295–98)Because Democritus believes that it's luckier to possess talentthan mere skill, and denies a place on Helicon to sane poets,a good number of artists make a point of not cutting their nailsor trimming their beards, but head for secret haunts and avoid baths.Despite the verbal echo, the change of tone and context at this point rules out any straightforward association of the unguem in line 294 with the ungues in line 297.6 Horace's humorous sketch of those "artistic types" who model their insalubrious habits on a superficial view of Democritean inspiration initiates a new section of the poem.7 It looks forward to a fuller consideration of the relative value of ars and ingenium, about which in due course Horace gives his opinion as follows:natura fieret laudabile carmen an artequaesitum est. ego nec studium sine divite venanec rude quid possit video ingenium; alterius sicaltera poscit opem res et coniurat amice.(AP 408–11) [End Page 412]The question is: Is good poetry due to nature or art?I myself fail to see what artistry can achieve without a rich vein of natural ability,or raw talent without application, to such a degree does the one attributedraw upon the other and make common cause with it.The only other instance of ad unguem in Horace is in Satires 1.5, where the phrase similarly appears tout court, conjoined to a past participle in a construction which parallels praesectum... ad unguem as construed above: interea Maecenas advenit atqueCocceius Capitoque simul Fonteius, ad unguemfactus homo, Antoni non ut magis alter amicus.(Sat. 1.5.31–33) Meanwhile Maecenas arrives andCocceius, and with them Fonteius Capito, a manof such consummate charm that Antony holds none dearer.Whether ad unguem here refers to physical or intellectual refinement (or both), the connotation "to perfection" is evident. Commentators ancient and modern have generally supposed that the metaphor is best explained by the image which Persius, writing around a century later, developed in his First Satire:quis populi sermo est? quis enim, nisi carmina mollinunc demum numero fluere, ut per leve severoseffundat iunctura ungues?(Sat. 1.63–65)"What's the word from the general public? "What else, but thatnow at last there are verses so fluent that no join jars criticalfingernails as they glide across the smooth surface.In commenting on AP 294, Ps.–Acro adduced this precisely evocative idea of "critical fingernails" for Horace's use of ad unguem:"ad unguem": tractum a... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Political Philosophy of Fénelon by Ryan Patrick HanleyJohn J. Conley SJRyan Patrick Hanley. The Political Philosophy of Fénelon. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. xvi + 306. Hardback, $41.95.In his monograph, Ryan Patrick Hanley offers a revisionist interpretation of the political philosophy of François de Salignac de la Mothe-Fénelon, archbishop of Cambrai. A series of Enlightenment commentators (Montesquieu, Rousseau, Hume, Jefferson) and their progeny have hailed Fénelon (...) as a political subversive who boldly attacked the injustices of the reign of Louis XIV and who prepared the arrival of an egalitarian society with socialist and pacifist traits. Hanley, however, argues that Fénelon actually defended a more moderate and realistic model of political society than his Enlightenment exegetes have suggested. Like earlier commentators, Hanley attempts to prove his argument primarily through an analysis of Telemachus, the pedagogical novel Fénelon had composed for Louis, duc de Bourgogne, the "petit Dauphin" and grandson of Louis XIV, when Fénelon served as his tutor.Three strong chapters demonstrate Hanley's thesis concerning Fénelon's moderate politics and philosophy. Hanley argues that Fénelon's philosophy of education rests on a distinction between true and false glory. True glory resides in virtue and a humble recognition of divine glory, while false glory is the self-centered glorification of the human agent, which easily deteriorates into vanity. Rather than simply condemn self-interest, in his treatment of the education of the prince Fénelon argues that self-interest must be gradually transformed into a broader interest for the good of one's subjects and a deeper recognition of the glory of God. Earning the praise of his Enlightenment acolytes and later feminist commentators, Fénelon defends a solid education for women, but he clearly wants this education to prepare women for their domestic role as wives and mothers; his celebrated treatise and letters on the education of women are not an exercise in gender equality.The economic theory of Fénelon has often been interpreted as a type of utopian socialism. This is largely based on the central place taken by Bétique in the Telemachus. In this mythical land, the happy citizens practice a communist economics; private property is foreign to them. All their basic needs are provided for through communal cooperation. Luxury is also foreign to them; precious metals like gold and silver are used in practical construction as if they were pieces of iron. But Hanley argues that the prosocialist exegetes ignore the varied economies presented in the passages concerning Egypt, Crete, and Tyre. Bétique does not stand alone as an economic ideal. When Fénelon details how the economy of contemporary France should be reformed, it is far from simple socialism. The state has a strong initial role in the state's economic reform, but it works in tandem with private initiatives that will gradually become the stronger partner. "Fénelon differs from later socialists in insisting that the use of state power is not an end in itself, but necessary only to establish the conditions whereby a free economic system can emerge and flourish—at which point direct intervention of the state into economic affairs will diminish, and a free (though hardly unbridled) pursuit of self-interest will be encouraged" (81).Hanley also attacks the common argument that Fénelon is a pacifist who excoriates all recourse to war. Fénelon does indeed condemn war in the most graphic terms. As Archbishop of Cambrai in northern France, he had witnessed the brutal carnage and attendant famines that had decimated the population in repeated wars in this border area. But his nuanced critique of war rests on a distinction between false and true courage. False courage is found in the warrior who initiates war for the sake of his own false glory. True courage lies in those who defend the innocent out of a proper sense of duty; this courage contrasts with cowardice disguised as pacificism. Hanley argues that the confederation of nations that Fénelon envisions as a mechanism to mediate conflict and reduce the recourse to war is less a species of international government than... (shrink)

One of the most important pieces of evidence which we possess concerning the judicial rights of Roman provincials, particularly their status in relation to the governor's tribunal, is provided by Cicero's brief outline of those provisions of the lex Rupilia, the Sicilian provincial charter, which dealt with judicial administration. The passage reads as follows: Siculi hoc iure sunt ut, quod civis cum cive agat, domi certet suis legibus, quod Siculus cum Siculo non eiusdem civitatis, ut de eo praetor iudices ex (...) P. Rupili decreto, quod is de decem legatorum sententia statuit, quam legem Rupiliam vocant, sortiatur. Quod privatus a populo petit ant populus a privato, senatus ex aliqua civitate qui iudicet datur, cum alternae civitates reiectae sunt; quod civis Romanus a Siculo petit, Siculus index, quod Siculus a civi Romano, civis Romanus datur; ceterarum rerum selecti iudices ex conventu civium Romanorum nr000ni solent. (shrink)

Sic effata et osculis hiantibus filium diu ac pressule saviata proximas oras reflui litoris petit, plantisque roseis vibrantium fluctuum summo rore calcato ecce iam profundi mans sudo resedit vertice, et ipsum quod incipit velle, set statim, quasi pridem praeceperit, non moratur marinum obsequium: adsunt Nerei filiae chorum canentes et Portunus caerulis barbis hispidus et gravis piscoso sinu Salacia et auriga parvulus delphini Palaemon….

In 1736 Colin MacLaurin, Professor of Mathematics in the University of Edinburgh petitioned the Town Council for permission to erect an astronomical observatory in the College to broaden the research and teaching base of the University. After MacLaurin's death, the Town Council and University Senate, more concerned with the promotion of the Infirmary and associated medical teaching, took no further action. The funds raised by MacLaurin were lent to his successor, and largely dissipated. In 1776 the balance was transferred to (...) the proposed Calton Hill Observatory. This private scheme was to be financially self-sufficient, generating income from the casual visitor and fees charged to students. It too failed. Funds were wasted on unnecessary architectural elaboration, the Town Council failed to meet their financial obligations, the University acquiesced in the total inactivity of the Regius Professor of Astronomy, whilst the commercial management-base of the Observatory vitiated any serious scientific activity. (shrink)

The Curia dei Foretani, or the Court of the Countrymen, of the commune of Lucca was a sort of rural small-claims court. Designed by an urban government to hear minor civil cases which originated in the countryside, it was occupied with the variety of issues that punctuated country life, most especially cases brought by landlords, merchants, and speculators whose living was tied to the rural economy of northwestern Tuscany. The records of the Curia dei Foretani offer an unusual opportunity to (...) investigate landlord-tenant, lender-borrower, and speculator-producer relations during the critical period of the fourteenth century when urban interest in the countryside was intense. As will become clear, the streamlined procedure used by the court was designed to allow rapid petition, hearing, and judgment, which, it has been argued, were designed to favor the wealthy, usually urban, elites. Yet as analysis of the actual functioning of the court will show, villagers in this part of Tuscany were able to avoid, or at least moderate, the most complete forms of landlord domination. The reasons why are complex, but one aspect was the court procedure itself, which could be manipulated by knowledgeable members of strong, semi-autonomous rural communities who had access to legal advice or who had broadly based communal support for their actions. Urban landlords in the Lucchesia never achieved the sort of economic domination of rural life which seems to have typified the region around Florence and Siena. (shrink)

Some tradition historical perspectives on Psalm 83 Psalm 83 forms a poetical unit and is the well constructed poem of an artist. It could be divided into two stanzas which contains a cry for help (2), lament (3-9) and several petitions (10-19). This work reflects different tradition historical allusions. The use of prophetic language is immanent, while the faces of the prophets Isaiah, Jeremiah and Ezekiel are elusively present. Two episodes from the history of the Judges (Judges 4-5; 7-8) are (...) utilised to expose its independent function in this psalm. The occurence of a well known Canaanite tradition is further obvious, while the question into the psalm's apocalyptic relationships is negatively assessed. Single motives like the upliftment of the head (3) and the shepherd/flock image (13) fulfil a definite Junction within the psalm’s context. The poet clearly applied historical traditions, motives and images to express an independent function within its context. (shrink)

Booker T. Washington's Cotton States Exposition Address enlarges our understanding of the genre of witnessing by presenting a version of public testimony and historical remembrance sharply at odds with contemporary definitions of the genre. Washington's resolute choice to lend voice as a living witness to the atrocities of slavery in the service of conspicuously pragmatic and narrowly defined interests rather than universal human rights dramatically separates his performance of public witnessing from its late modern forms. Whereas survivors of historical atrocity (...) in the post–World War II era ritually assume the difficult responsibility of testifying to past evils with the greatest possible accuracy, Washington relates the history of slavery—most notably its legacy of heinous human rights abuses—in radically inventive ways. The address demonstrates that those who embody the putative collective voice of subaltern communities may, in particular circumstances, call on the public to willfully forget, rather than somberly remember, the crimes of history. In doing so, the speech also suggests that the ability to bear witness may not automatically result in the ability to petition for equal human rights. (shrink)

IntroductionIn recent years, there has been something of an explosion of news stories about various college and university campuses across North America experiencing heightened levels of political advocacy and political unrest. Visible examples include the “canceling” of invited speakers who have been deemed offensive by select student groups1 or petitions calling for the removal of instructors who have been accused of using harmful language.2 While these examples shed light on some of the more intense political debates circulating in higher educational (...) institutions, they are also newsworthy stories precisely because they suggest strong divisiveness in worldviews in action—the contradiction between different…. (shrink)

Broadening access to both computational and educational resources is crit- ical to diffusing machine learning (ML) innovation. However, today, most ML resources and experts are siloed in a few countries and organizations. In this article, we describe our pedagogical approach to increasing access to applied ML through a massive open online course (MOOC) on Tiny Machine Learning (TinyML). We suggest that TinyML, applied ML on resource-constrained embedded devices, is an attractive means to widen access because TinyML leverages low-cost and globally (...) accessible hardware and encourages the development of complete, self-contained applications, from data collection to deployment. To this end, a collaboration between academia and industry produced a four part MOOC that provides application-oriented instruction on how to develop solutions using TinyML. The series is openly available on the edX MOOC platform, has no prerequisites beyond basic programming, and is designed for global learners from a variety of backgrounds. It introduces real-world applications, ML algorithms, data-set engineering, and the ethi- cal considerations of these technologies through hands-on programming and deployment of TinyML applications in both the cloud and on their own microcontrollers. To facili- tate continued learning, community building, and collaboration beyond the courses, we launched a standalone website, a forum, a chat, and an optional course-project com- petition. We also open-sourced the course materials, hoping they will inspire the next generation of ML practitioners and educators and further broaden access to cutting-edge ML technologies. (shrink)

Translator's preface -- Commentator's preface -- Commentator's introduction -- J.G. Fichte : on the ground of our belief in a divine world-governance -- Commentary: on the ground of our belief in a divine world-governance -- Text: on the ground of our belief in a divine world-governance -- F.K. Forberg : development of the concept of religion -- Commentary: development of the concept of religion -- Text: development of the concept of religion -- G.: a father's letter to his student son (...) about Fichte's and forberg's atheism -- Commentary: a father's letter to his student son about Fichte's and Forberg's atheism -- Text: a father's letter to his student son abou tFichte's and Gorberg's atheism -- Friedrich August : Saxon requisition letter to the Weimar Court and Karl August : Weimar rescript to the University of Jena -- Commentary: Saxon requisition letter to the Weimar Court and Weimar rescript to the University of Jena -- Text: Saxon requisition letter to the weimar court -- Text: Weimar rescript to the University of Jena -- J.G. Fichte: appeal to the public -- Commentary: appeal to the public -- Text: appeal to the public -- K.l. Reinhold: letter to Fichte -- Commentary:letter to fichte -- Text: letter to Fichte -- J.G. Fichte : juridical defense -- Commentary: juridical defense -- Text: juridical defense -- Ernst I. Ludwig : Gotha rescript to the University of Jena -- Commentary: Gotha rescript to the University of Jena -- Text: Gotha rescript to the University of Jena -- Students of the University of Jena : first petition to Duke Karl, August of Saxony, Weimar, Eisenach and Karl August : first reply to the University of Jena and students of the University of Jena : second petition to Duke Karl, August of Saxony, Weimar, Eisenach and Karl August : second reply to the University of Jena -- Commentary: first and second petitions to Duke Karl, August of Saxony, Weimar, Eisenach and first and second replies to the University of Jena -- Text: first petition to Duke Karl, August of Saxony, Weimar, Eisenach -- Text: first reply to the University of Jena -- Text: second petition to Duke Karl, August of Saxony, Weimar, Eisenach -- Text: second reply to the University of Jena -- J.G. Fichte : from a private letter -- Commentary: from a private letter -- Text: from a private letter -- J.G. Fichte : concluding remark by the editor -- Commentary: concluding remark by the editor -- Text: concluding remark by the editor. (shrink)

Dès la Bible, l’oeuvre d’art a souvent été dénoncée comme apparence trompeuse et incitation à l’adoration idolâtrique. S’affranchissant de ses fonctions essentiellement religieuses, elle est ensuite passée des églises aux musées, de l’adoration religieuse à l’admiration esthétique, d’une présence sacrée à l’expression du génie de l’artiste. Aujourd’hui, alors que certains dénoncent la quête de l’art pour l’art et que l’image règne sur les grands et les petits écrans, il demeure toujours aussi difficile d’apprécier l’image à sa juste valeur, de reconnaître (...) sa fonction médiatrice, entre idolâtrie et iconoclasme, entre aveuglement et lucidité désabusée. Ni vraie ni fausse, l’image est les deux à la fois: elle peut libérer comme elle peut asservir. (shrink)

Lorsque j’effectuais mes recherches sur les mineurs de Decazeville au début des années 1980, j’eus une longue conversation un soir, avec mes hôtes, à propos de leurs exemplaires usés de L’Histoire de la France contemporaine 1789-1981 en huit volumes, publiée aux Éditions sociales. Cette conversation m’est revenue à l’esprit en lisant Les Luttes et les Rêves. Une histoire populaire de la France de 1685 à nos jours. Peut-être les petits-enfants de mes hôtes ont-ils hérité de ces livres ; j’espè...

« Voici, cher lecteur, ce qui a fait le divertissement de quelques heures de loisir que je n’étais pas d’humeur d’employer à autre chose. Si cet ouvrage a le bonheur d’occuper de la même manière quelque petite partie d’un temps où vous serez bien aise de vous relâcher de vos affaires plus importantes, et que vous preniez seulement la moitié tant de plaisir à le lire que j’en ai eu à le composer, vous n’aurez pas, je crois, plus de regret (...) à votre argent que j’en ai eu à ma peine. »Nous reproduisons ici la traduction de Coste, celle-là même que Leibniz a sous les yeux en composant ses Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain. Elle a été faite en présence de Locke et avec son aide et acquiert ainsi la valeur d’un texte original. (shrink)

"Malebranche est un penseur étonnant, et d'autant plus qu'en un sens, pour qui n'est pas chrétien, et chrétien convaincu, il semble inutilisable. Mais quant à la sincérité, à la lumière qui baigne toute l'entreprise, au style souple et charmeur, à la conviction audacieuse et toujours sur la brèche de ses stupéfiantes démonstrations, Malebranche est incomparable. On va de merveille en merveille, comme si on visitait une admirable église remplie de petites peintures toutes plus surprenantes les unes que les autres. Lorsque (...) je suis revenu au Traité de la nature et de la grâce, quelque chose comme une grâce m'a en effet touché. J'espère qu'à votre tour, lecteurs, vous en serez touchés", Alain Badiou. (shrink)

One of the most influential scientific treatises in Cauchy's era was J.-L. Lagrange's Mécanique Analytique, the second edition of which came out in 1811, when Cauchy was barely out of his teens. Lagrange opens his treatise with an unequivocal endorsement of infinitesimals. Referring to the system of infinitesimal calculus, Lagrange writes:Lorsqu'on a bien conçu l'esprit de ce système, et qu'on s'est convaincu de l'exactitude de ses résultats par la méthode géométrique des premières et dernières raisons, ou par la méthode analytique (...) des fonctions dérivées, on peut employer les infiniment petits comme un instrument sûr et commode pour abréger et simplifier les demonstrations.Lagrange's renewed enthusiasm for .. (shrink)

" Pour chanter les vingt ans du Pommier, mon éditrice me demanda d'écrire quelques lignes. Les voici. Pour une fois, j'y entre en morale, comme en terre nouvelle et inconnue, sur la pointe des pieds. On disait jadis de l'Arlequin de mes rêves, bienheureux comédien de l'art, qu'il corrigeait les moeurs en riant. Devenu arrière-grand-père, son disciple a, de même, le devoir sacré de raconter des histoires à ses petits descendants en leur enseignant à faire des grimaces narquoises. Parvenus ensemble (...) à l'âge espiègle, j'en profite pour leur dire de l'austère en pouffant de rire. " Michel Serres. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy in Late AntiquityMichael F. WagnerDominic J. O'Meara. Platonopolis: Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003. Pp. xi + 249. Cloth, $55.00.Porphyry tells of Plotinus's failed petition to emperor Gallienus to (re)establish a "city of philosophers" conformed to Plato's laws, named Platonopolis (Vit. Plo.12). O'Meara here articulates primary themes and developments in philosophical political thought in the classical Neoplatonic period, from Plotinus's (...) day in the mid-third century into the sixth century. Concurrently, he addresses head on "the conventional view that the Platonist philosophers of Late Antiquity had no political philosophy" (3). This view exemplifies the more general perspective that the Neoplatonists were simply disinterested in this-worldly affairs in lieu of "an immaterial world... our true 'homeland,' where we can at last attain the good we desire" (3). Consequently, O'Meara provides both a unique study of an important [End Page 205] topic and a compelling case for a more complete, balanced understanding of Neoplatonic other-worldly-ness. O'Meara's study covers key figures from four main groups of (neo)Platonists: Plotinus and his students; the schools in Syria and Asia Minor inspired by Iamblichus; the Athenian school (Plutarch, Proclus, Damascius et al.); and the Alexandrian school (Hyapatia, Philoponus, Olympiodorus et al.). He organizes his investigation (chapters) into three Parts.The pivotal concept in O'Meara's two-pronged endeavor is divinization - "assimilation and unification, as far as possible, to god" (31, Proclus) - a concept whose meaning for classical Neoplatonists ranges from "becoming a god" to "imitating some form of divine life, in one way or another" (31). Part I focuses on the Neoplatonists' shared association of a human soul's divinization with virtue-osity [my jargon], beginning with Plotinus's distinction between political virtue(s) and purification—or purificatory virtue(s). O'Meara emphasizes the relevance of the resulting "scale of virtues" to a life of continued activity—for example explicating Plotinus's denial that a "purified" soul is somehow exempt from the rightness-of-acting expected of the politically virtuous soul: rather, "reaching higher principles and different measures he will act [directly, immediately] according to these" (43, En. I,2,7).Another organizing theme as O'Meara's investigations proceed beyond Plotinus is the significance of the increasing complexities of particular Neoplatonic metaphysical systems, and so also of their moral systems - e.g. their "scales of virtue." Part I also articulates related attempts (beginning with Porphyry and Iamblichus) to articulate programs of moral and philosophical study - i.e. a related "scale of sciences." Of special note here are proposals by some Neoplatonists to divide the "practical sciences" associated on this scale with political virtuousness into legislative science(s) and judicial science (56). Implicit in the Neoplatonic scale(s) of virtue(s) was the thesis that as one progresses towards divinization "lower" virtue-osity is not transcended in the sense of lost or dismissed but rather it is included or incorporated into a higher form. Arguably, "lower" sciences are likewise not merely aids or stepping-stones towards something "higher," but genuine topoi of study and knowledge in their own right.Part II is the true heart of O'Meara's outstanding scholarly and philosophical inquiry. Here is where he fulfills his intent to discern a substantive tradition of political philosophy and to articulate its key themes and concepts. Though he associates this part of his investigation with Plato's conceit of the philosopher's return to the cave, he immediately parses this "descent" as a "divinization of political life through philosophy" (71). He articulates various Neoplatonists' approaches to questions inspired by Plato's cave allegory—e.g. Is the philosopher socially obligated to "return"? Could s/he then still be happy? (His investigation here does seem to overlook Neoplatonic conceptions of choice, volition, or will as these might pertain to such questions.) O'Meara recognizes, however, that the more fundamental link between Neoplatonic metaphysics and Neoplatonic ethical-political thought derives from Plotinus's conception "of fecundity, of an [overflowing] abundance" (74) in his highest One, and so in a soul assimilated to It. In Proclus's formulation: "that which... (shrink)

La présente étude se propose d’examiner la conception tout à fait originale de Bentham concernant une éducation démocratique fondée sur des intellectuels qui visent à établir une société libérale, contrairement à l’éducation civique d’aujourd’hui. Tout d’abord, j’examine les recherches récentes sur l’éducation civique, qui sont liées à un tournant délibératif, en montrant en quoi elles diffèrent des objectifs que Bentham s’assignait pour l’éducation. Ensuite, en évoquant l’évolution des travaux de recherche concernant les relations entre Bentham et Foucault, je souligne que (...) Foucault appréhendait l’aspect démocratique du panoptique de Bentham et le liait à la gouvernementalité libérale. En troisième lieu, j’analyse les idées de Bentham sur l’éducation. Cette analyse comprend deux volets : ses idées concernant l’éducation de bons citoyens dotés d’intelligence, et sa conception de l’éducation comme expérimentation. Bentham considérait l’éducation intellectuelle de l’école chrestomatique comme une protection contre les illusions pernicieuses. Les idées de Bentham sur l’éducation, d’une part, visaient à favoriser l’émergence de bons citoyens pouvant participer au Tribunal de l’opinion publique, et de dirigeants compétents ayant les qualités intellectuelles voulues pour diriger ou suivre l’opinion publique. D’autre part, Bentham souhaitait ardemment que l’éducation fût une expérimentation destinée à établir une société libérale entièrement recréée depuis ses fondements. Il exprima ce souhait dans la dernière partie de ses lettres sur Le Panoptique, qui traitait de l’application des principes du panoptique aux écoles et de son plan de contrôle des pauvres. Afin de réformer la société existante gouvernée par un petit nombre de dirigeants uniquement soucieux de leurs intérêts dévoyés, il chercha à promouvoir la publicité et l’éducation intellectuelle pour contrer cette mauvaise gestion. Si, par contre, la société pouvait être établie de manière idéale dès ses débuts, alors une société entièrement nouvelle pourrait émerger sur la base des principes utilitaristes, qui donneraient corps à l’identification artificielle des intérêts entre chaque individu et l’ensemble de la communauté. La pensée éducative de Bentham était une entreprise à double face, qui s’adressait à la fois au présent et à l’avenir. (shrink)

On vise à saisir les dynamiques de petits groupes sociaux et de réseaux personnels, de leur formation initiale à leur délitement. Pour cela, depuis 2011, je mène des enquêtes ethnographiques dans trois résidences universitaires en France, aux États-Unis et au Canada. J’effectue ainsi une analyse sur deux niveaux : celui de plusieurs groupes suivis conjointement sur chacun de ces terrains, et celui des relations et des réseaux qui émergent et évoluent. J’articule la représentation graphique des réseaux personnels à des données (...) qualitatives sur ces groupes et ces réseaux. La représentation des liens et des réseaux permet de compléter l’étude des relations affinitaires et de leurs degrés d’intensité. Elle donne aussi à voir l’évolution des réseaux personnels au cours de l’année universitaire. Les descriptions ethnographiques, quant à elles, révèlent la réflexivité des acteurs sur leurs réseaux personnels, et sur leurs évolutions. Cette analyse permet dès lors d’identifier quatre étapes dans le processus de formation et transformation de petits groupes sociaux. Ces quatre temporalités se retrouvent dans l’ensemble des groupes suivis conjointement, malgré la pluralité de leurs compositions. Nous pouvons alors nous demander si dans tout groupe social de ce type se retrouveraient ces quatre temps. En ce sens, cette recherche contribue à compléter les travaux sur les réseaux personnels et les temporalités de leurs évolutions, en apportant une démarche ethnographique et microsociologique. (shrink)

El presente artículo se centra en el esclarecimiento de las nociones de percepciones inconscientes («petites perceptions»), percepciones y apercepciones en la teoría de la conciencia en Leibniz con el fin de responder dos preguntas: 1) Ad intra, es decir, intra-sustancialmente: ¿Cómo un evento inconsciente se vuelve consciente dentro de una misma sustancia simple?; 2) Ad extra, es decir, inter-sustancialmente: ¿dónde puede decirse que surge la conciencia en la jerarquía de mónadas? Para responder estas preguntas, seguiré la siguiente metodología. En primer (...) lugar, presentaré la teoría de la conciencia en Leibniz enmarcada en su visión metafísica. Presentaré a su vez los pasajes más conflictivos y el problema que surge al momento de definir la conciencia. En segundo lugar, presentaré las interpretaciones más comentadas que existen actualmente acerca de este problema. Me centraré en las posturas de Rocco J. Gennaro, Larry M. Jorgensen, Christian Barth y Alison Simmons. Finalmente, propondré una interpretación propia de la teoría de la conciencia en Leibniz. (shrink)

"La philosophie du langage" (1979), de J.-P. Resweber, est un petit ouvrage fort ambitieux, où se côtoient les principales tendances de la linguistique contemporaine, les courants les plus actuels de la philosophie, la fine fleur de la psychanalyse et divers courants des sciences sociales. L'ouvrage se propose, entre autres, de "débrouiller" le vocabulaire qui transite d'une discipline à l'autre et d'en lever les ambiguïtés. La présente étude critique lui reproche, exemples à l'appui, d'embrouiller au contraire systématiquement les choses, et (...) elle plaide en faveur de la nécessité d'une sorte d"éthique de la modification terminologique. (shrink)

Préface [Mars 1990] Pour être agréable à une amie du Lycée Albert Sarraut à Hanoi qui voulait rassembler des documents afin de constituer un témoignage sur la vie quotidienne des Français en Indochine jusqu’en 1945, j'ai fouillé dans mes papiers conservés en vrac dans un carton. J'y ai retrouvé ces notes écrites sur trois petits carnets, au jour le jour, dans la voiture qui nous emmenait pour ces vacances 1943. Je les avais oubliés depuis trente ans! […] Je ne me (...) doutais pas que deux ans apr... (shrink)

"A demain le bon sexe"... disait, non sans une pointe d'ironie, Michel Foucault, au plus fort de la "révolution sexuelle", et l'on sentait que ce n'était pas gagné. Qu'est-ce que le bon sexe? J'ai écrit ce livre en neuf mois... et toute une vie... Sans doute, pour moi, une manière de réaliser une certaine façon qui fut mienne d'être femme je me revois, dans ma petite chambre mansardée, étudiante, tentant en vain de lire en son entier l'Histoire de la sexualité (...) de Michel Foucault... Que savais-je de la sexualité, que pouvais-je recevoir de cet essai, que je trouvais grandiose, lumineux et obscur? Foucault, le seul des philosophes à parler de "ces choses-là", était bien isolé. Il faudrait du temps pour que ses écrits fassent leur route et du temps pour changer les mentalités. Du temps aussi pour moi, pour pouvoir les entendre, qu'ils fassent écho en moi. "Le sexe, disait Foucault, ça s'administre, la sexualité, ça se subit ; quant à la sensualité, elle est chaque jour à inventer." J'ai voulu rouvrir le dossier, emprunter les chemins qu'il a tracés en 1976 en écrivant son Histoire de la sexualité, qui est l'histoire des discours sur la sexualité, eux-mêmes histoire des corps investis par le pouvoir. Danièle Sastre. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:REDISCOVERING VIRTUE* SERVAIS PINCK.AERS, 0.P. L!universite de Fribourg Fribourg, Switzerland INTRODUCTION: THE DEBATE ABOUT VIRTUE VIRTUE is back. Especially in the United States, a widespread discussion about its role in moral theology has been initiated, a discussion modeled on Aristotle's Ethics, particularly as Aristotle's thought was developed in the Middle Ages by Thomas Aquinas. Accompanying this rediscovery of virtue is a criticism of modern ethical theories. These theories, having (...) broken with Aristotelian tradition, have led to a burgeoning of contradictory systems: a morality of obligation on the Kantian model; utilitarian morality; and a radical critique of morality by Nietzsche. Because of such divergences any discussion between moralists, especially where the foundations and principles of morality are involved, has up to the present seemed doomed to failure.1 •Translated by Sr. Mary Thomas Noble, O.P. 1 The author who has contributed most to this discussion of virtue is undoubtedly Alasdair Macintyre in his three principal books: After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981; second edition, 1984); Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 1988); Three Versions of Moral Inquiry: Encyclopedia, Genealogy, and 1radition (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 1990). The Italian edition of the last book, Enciclopedia, Genealogia e 1radizione (Milan, 1993), includes a special introduction on Macintyre and a biography. I should also like to mention the article by Martha Nussbaum, "Virtue Revived," Times Literary Supplement 4657 Ouly 3, 1992): 9-11. See also a recent book by Andre Comte-Sponville, Petit traite des grands vertus (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1995). This work is very interesting because it proposes to a wide readership a moral system drawn from Aristotle that is at the same time based entirely on modern philosophy. In my opinion the author unintentionally confirms the thesis of the incompatibility of modern ethical systems of obligation and the 361 362 SERVAIS PINCKAERS, O.P. In view of this ethical pluralism, certain philosophers have undertaken to set up ethical norms through reflection on justice, using the methods of discussion and decision prevalent in our democratic societies. The initiative has been designated as procedural ethics.2 In this rather chaotic situation, other writers have thought a return to Aristotelian ethics opportune-a move that would enable us to reconnect with the long tradition of virtue-based morality represented therein, while bringing it up to date. In fact, the introduction of the concept of virtue offers many opportunities for the shaping of a morality that takes the human person into account. Virtue is a dynamic human quality acquired through education and personal effort. It forms character and assures continuity in action. Furthermore, it is set within the framework of community and a strong tradition, to whose development it contributes. Teaching on virtue would seem to be a good corrective for excessive individualism. This is what the socalled "communitarian" trend has emphasized.3 The debate on virtue has also surfaced within traditional Catholic teaching. Since the first half of this century, under the inspiration of St. Thomas, several authors of moral theology textbooks have undertaken to reorganize special morality on the basis of the virtues rather than the ten commandments, as had been done since the seventeenth century.4 Admittedly, the change Aristotelian construct of the virtues held by Macintyre. With the moderns he rejects a natural foundation for morality, within man, and thus robs the virtues he treats of their deep roots. Virtue is not spontaneous; it remains voluntaristic. 2 To mention a few titles: K. 0. Apel, Transformation der Philosophie, 2 vols. (Frankfurt, 1981); Apel, Ethique de la discussion (Paris, 1994); J.M. Ferry, Philosophie de la communication (Paris, 1994); Jiirgen Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handeln, 2 vols. (Frankfurt, 1981); Habermas, Moralbewusstsein und kommunikativer Handeln (Frankfurt, 1983); John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (Harvard, 1971). 3 See, for example: J. H. Joder, Jesus et le politique: La radicalite ethique de la croix (Lausanne, 1984); S. Hauerwas, The Peacable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (Notre Dame, 1983); W. Reese-Schafer, Was ist Kommunitarismus? (Frankfurt, 1994); Charles Taylor, The Sources ofthe Self: The Making ofthe Modern Identity (Cambridge, Mass., 1989... (shrink)